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As automatic natural language processing (NLP) moves out of the era of toy pilot projects and begins to grapple with real-life language in all its complexity, it needs access to quantities of information about individual lexical items. The only plausible source of such information lies in machine-readable versions of ordinary published dictionaries; although they are designed for other purposes and are far from ideal for computer use, they represent an investment of resources that the computational linguistics research community is in no position to match. This book, whose various chapters are co-authored by a total of sixteen contributors drawn from research groups at Cambridge, Amsterdam, and New Mexico State University, is about the issues that have arisen in exploiting one dictionary, the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English ( LDOCE ), for NLP purposes.
Topics covered include: the translation of what was originally a typesetting tape into a format enabling the computer to locate efficiently the various categories of information specified for a given word; the relationship between grammatical information as listed for entries in the dictionary and the categories required by the theoretical linguist; the use of pronunciation information in speechrecognition systems; and various tentative experiments in deriving computer-usable semantic information from the definition portions of dictionary entries. A series of appendices gives useful factual information about the dictionary and its vocabulary. Since all the work discussed relates to LDOCE, it concerns English exclusively; at one point (p. 8) the editors offer a French example that is truly hair-raising in spelling and pronunciation, but this is a rare blemish in a book whose standard of editing and production is high.
The research reported has a solid and professional quality. These are no dilettantes musing on how in principle one might aim to achieve a given task, but people who have set about getting the job done, for the whole language, and tell us here what problems they encountered and how far they were successful. Most of the problems will be common to any published dictionary, and the introductory chapter and the bibliography give very full coverage of dictionary-based NLP research in general; for a research group aiming to work with a different English dictionary, or a dictionary of another language, this book would be an excellent place to start. Although much of the emphasis is rightly on practical computing considerations, there are also many novel and valuable theoretical insights. David Carter, discussing speech-recognition systems that use partial phonetic information to produce classes of candidate words, points out that standard ways of measuring the systems' performance are grossly misleading, both because they ignore relative frequencies of words in a class and because measurement ought to be logarithmic rather than linear--to whittle a vocabulary of 10,000 words down to a class of 100 candidates is to do half, not 99%, of the task of identifying the stimulus. Theoretical linguists have claimed that various aspects of grammatical subcategorization of lexical items are predictable from meaning and thematic structure, as one might well expect (how can a person master a language unless such matters are governed by general rules?), but Boguraev and Briscoe exploit that fact that LDOCE codes individual verb-senses for susceptibility to dative alternation (Sally slid the drink to Susan --* Sally slid Susan the drink) in order to submit this idea to detailed testing, and they find that none of the proposed rules holds; whether dative alternation is permissible seems to be an aribtrary fact about individual senses of individual words (a point that underlines the crucial importance of full-scale dictionaries in NLP).
Rather than discussing each chapter of this book in detail, in the rest of my review I shall take up two issues that recur in many chapters and on which I am inclined to question the position put forward by the contributors.
The first has to do with how far an ordinary published dictionary comparable to LDOCE (which has 55,000 entries) provides adequate coverage of text, in view of the open-ended quality of any natural language and the fact that published dictionaries do not try to cover proper names. Many contributors to the book reviewed are quite pessimistic, suggesting that while published dictionaries are the best resources we have, they fall very far short of adequate coverage of the language. The writers repeatedly refer to Walker and Amsler (1986) , who studied the extent of correspondence between a large sample (over 8 million word-tokens) of material from the New York Times news service, and the (approximately 70,000) entries of Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. Walker and Amsler say that as many as 64% of the word-types in their corpus do not occur in the dictionary. This surprised me, since it seemed to contradict the findings of a smaller-scale piece of research that I carried out (Sampson 1989 ) before learning of Walker and Amsler's work. I ran the computer-usable version prepared by Roger Mitton (1986) of the third edition of the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary ( OALD3 ) against a 45,622 word-token subset of the LOB Corpus, in order to analyze in detail the nature of the gaps in the dictionary (like Amsler and Walker, I eliminated punctuation, "words" consisting of digits, etc.). Only 1,477 word-tokens, or 3.24% of my sample, were missing from the dictionary. Although I was counting tokens while Walker and Amsler counted types, in itself this can hardly explain more than a fraction of the difference between our results. Zipf's Law, taken in conjunction with the rank/frequency information about the LOB Corpus in Hofland and Johansson (1982) , suggests that 44,145 tokens found in the dictionary might represent on the order of 18,000 types, and the 1,477 missing tokens represent 1,176 types, implying that in my sample the non-dictionary word types would be in the region of 6%. Walker and Amsler's dictionary lacked inflected forms and also some high-frequency proper names (though its total number of entries is nevertheless slightly lower than that of the Webster dictionary); furthermore, the news service corpus is likely to have a higher density of proper names than the LOB Corpus. But these factors do not account for the difference between Walker and Amsler's and my figures; they state that inflected forms and proper names comprise only half of their nondictionary word types, so that about one-third of all word types in their sample is missing from their dictionary without being names or inflected forms. (Because of the large scale of their experiment, Walker and Amsler are not in a position to give detailed analyses of this one-third.) I can only suppose that the discrepancy between Walker and Amsler's figure of one-third and my 6% stems from the fact that relative size of sample matters when counting missing types, rather than missing tokens. Even if Walker and Amsler had no greater a proportion of nondictionary tokens than I, in their sample that would be a quarter of a million tokens, many of which would be unique types, while for either sample the bulk of tokens that are in the dictionary will be concentrated on the same few very common types. If Walker and Amsler had counted tokens rather than types, then (and had used a dictionary that listed inflected forms), it is not clear that they would have reached a figure much higher than my 3.24%. This puts a different gloss on the question of dictionary adequacy.
The second issue I should like to take up is the claim, made by several contributors to this book, that LDOCE is "uniquely suitable for computational lexicography" (p. 2). There has been an idea in the air for some time now that LDOCE is not just one lexical resource among others but, for computer applications, has a clear superiority over all alternatives. The point has not been easy to assess, since it relates in part to material found only in the electronic version of LDOCE, and (unlike Oxford, who have made OALD3 relatively freely available to computational researchers), Longman have strictly guarded their electronic copyright, allowing the dictionary to be used only by a few groups whose work is centered on it aPd who as a natural consequence have tended to champion it against its rivals. My own loyalties lie rather with OALD, edited by my Leeds./CCALAS colleague Anthony Cowie; this book offers a.n opportunity to try to establish how much of the claimed superiority of LDOCE is real and how much hype. (I shall compare LDOCE only with OALD; the book under review itself treats OALD as "the competition," and I have little experience with other dictionaries such as Webster's or the Collins/University of Birmingham COBUILD dictionary.)
Relevant points made by contributors fall under four headings: file format; "controlled vocabulary"; subject and "box" c~les; and grammatical classification schemes.
So far as file format is concerned, Eric Akkerman claims (p. 66) that "the computer-tape version of LDOCE turned out tCr be much more structured than that of OALD, which was basically a typesetting tape." This is certainly fair comment with respect to the tapes originally produced by the two publishers. For some time now, though, it has been of historical interest only, since more than one research group have produced parsed versions of the OALD3 tape. Furthermore, in this and other respects the critique of OALD in this book has been overtaken by the publication, also in 1989, of the fourth edition of OALD, which was designed from the start to be computer-tractable and has a format that I suspect is superior to that of the LDOCE tape (though, certainly, by no means as sophisticated as that of the resource that some of these researchers have created using LDOCE as their raw material).
"Controlled vocabulary" refers to the fact that the language: of LDOCE definitions is restricted to a specified set of some 2,200 words, each of which is supposed to be used only in its central sense(s). This might make it easier to deduce formalized representations of word meanings from the definitions, and several of the contributors who work on computational semantics express enthusiasm for this feature of LDOCE. The editors are much more cautious, however (see pp. 16, 34); and research by Jansen et al. (1987) makes it questionable how far one can accurately describe the LDOCE definition vocabulary as "controlled" at all. Furthermore, an explicit controlled-vocabulary policy is presumably an advantage only if, without it, lexicographers, tend to range more widely in phrasing their definitions. To test this, I looked at the examples of LDOCE definiti~3ns quoted by Hiyan Alshawi (p. 157ff), who has developed a system that attempts to assign word senses to general semantic categories by locating the grammatical head word of the definition, commonly a superordinate of the definiendum. In many cases the same head word occured in both OALD4 and LDOCE definitions; and in every case the OALD4 head word seemed at least as intuitively suitable as that in LDOCE as a core-vocabulary superordinate term--in the case of club (verb), one might think that OALD4 hit is more straightforward and unambiguous than LDOCE beat. OALD4 has no definition for bring out corresponding to LDOCE's "to introduce (usu. a young lady) into the social life of a great city."
Probably more important are the "subject" and "box" codes, which are included (in the subentries for individual word senses) only in the electronic LDOCE, not in the published version; this book seems to be the only public source of information about them. Subject codes are fourletter sequences that represent the topic and/or geographic domain in which a word or word sense is used, e.g. NAZV "nautical," GAQA "games/Argentina." The ten-character box codes express semantic selection restrictions; an example from page 14 is --L-X .... S for sandwich "to put tightly in between," where X in place 5 means preference for abstract or human subject, and S in place 10 means preference for solid object. Unfortunately, very little detail is given about the box code system; thus, although place 3 is said to be associated with "level of attitude," we are not told what the L in the sandwich box code means, and in general there is no statement of the range of categories expressed by these codes. Subject and box codes both look as though they might be genuinely significant NLP resources having no equivalent in other dictionaries; the subject codes might be usable for disambiguating words in context, the box codes could serve that purpose and also, conceivably, might make a contribution in grammatical parsing. But the book does not tell us enough to permit their value to be assessed, and the editors note .that "there are problems concerning the accuracy and completeness of this type of information in LDOCE .... None of the work reported in this book makes significant use of these codes."
The singlemost important reason for the book's claims about the superiority of LDOCE is its system of grammatical classification; Chapter 3, by Eric Akkerman, is an extended comparison between the classification schemes of LDOCE and OALD3, very much to the latter's disfavor. LDOCE uses a system of two-or three-part codes in which, broadly, a capital letter indicates part of speech and a digit indicates valency; in some cases a lowercase letter is added to indicate a finer subdivision. Thus the use of know as in "I know (that) he'll come" is coded T5a, in which T means "transitive verb with one object," 5 means "followed by a that-clause," and a means "'that can be omitted." OALD3 uses intuitive abbreviations (n, vt, prep, etc.) for the sort of information coded by capital letters in LDOCE; verb valencies are indicated by specifying one or more of the 51 "verb patterns" of a system worked out by A. S. Hornby, the first editor of OALD. The use of know just quoted is VP9, i.e., "S + vt + that-clause." One respect in which the LDOCE system is more flexible is that its valency digits can combine with letters for any part of speech to which they apply, not just with verb letters; thus 5 combines also with F (attributive adjective or adverb) to give a code F5a for sure as in "He was sure (that) she knew." Only a few combinations of nonverb letter with number are meaningful, but those that are give information that is not coded in OALD at all.
It is also fair to say, as Akkerman does, that the Hornby verb-pattern system is in some cases linguistically naive, failing to distinguish cases in which items occur together through a grammatical construction from cases of accidental juxtaposition. He quotes VP14A, "S + vi + toinfinitive," used in OALD3 both for come in "How did you come to know her?", where the to-clause is in construction with come, and for stop in "We stopped to have a rest," where the to-clause is an immediate constituent of the sentence. For reasons like this, the Hornby system has been abandoned in OALD4, which uses a more rational method of classifying verbs (it is also more advanced than the OALD3 system in other areas of grammar; for instance, it codes nine grammatical types of noun rather than just dividing nouns into countable and uncountable as in OALD3). Working through Akkerman's detailed comparison of the two dictionaries, I find that in most of the examples he quotes to illustrate the superiority of LDOCE over OALD3, the OALD4 coding of the relevant word senses escapes his criticism.
On the other hand, Akkerman also appears to me to be less than fair even to OALD3. He often seems to begin the axiom that the LDOCE grammatical distinctions are ideal, so that any deviation in OALD, whether by conflating classes that LDOCE distinguishes or by drawing distinctions that LDOCE does not make, must be bad. He complains (p. 75) that OALD3 has no code corresponding to the a of LDOCE T5a, showing that that can be left out from a finite clause following the verb; but this code is useful only if verbs differ with respect to omissibility of that, and omission of that is normally governed by considerations other than verb identity. (I thought ascertain might be a verb not tolerating omission of that; but LDOCE codes it as T5a.) Conversely, Akkerman says that there is no grammatical motivation for the Hornby-code distinction between verbs of physical perception and other verbs; but in (British) English the former verbs are grammatically distinctive in requiring can in the present tense ("I can see the car" but not *"I see the car"), though I am not sure whether this explains the feature of the Hornby system to which Akkerman refers. At one point (p. 74), Akkerman even criticizes the OALD3 system as inferior to that of LDOCE by reference to a point on which they seem to agree. Akkerman says that it is illogical for OALD3 to use a single Hornby code VP19C to cover the two uses of a verb like understand as in "I can't understand him behaving so foolishly" and "I can't understand his behaving so foolishly," arguing that the syntax of the two examples is very different. Again it is not clear that verbs differ in their propensity to occur in one of these patterns rather than in the other; but, more to the point, I can find only a single code, T1, applicable to either pattern in the LDOCE entry for understand.
In sum, I am not convinced that researchers without access to the Longman dictionary are doomed to secondclass citizenship in the emerging world of natural language
